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Abstract. What I am trying to do in the present text is to draw a sketch of postwar French 
philosophy from the perspective of the question of relations between philosophy and 
politics. I am showing a distinction between the community and the text that is present in 
this philosophy from Sartre to Barthes to Foucault and beyond. The general passage from 
the community-oriented philosophy (which I call "Hegelian") to the text-oriented 
philosophy (which I call "Nietzschean") took place in the sixties, following the books by 
Georges Bataille, Gilles Deleuze, and Pierre Klossowski on Nietzsche. I am discussing the 
formulation of this opposition by Jean-Paul Sartre ("the aesthete"/"the engaged writer"), 
its reversal suggested by Roland Barthes ("authors"/"writers") and, finally, an attempt 
made by Michel Foucault to go beyond the very oppositions pertaining to "writing" as such 
in his dichotomy of "universal intellectuals"/"specific intellectuals". The passage from the 
French Hegel to the French Nietzsche as a "master thinker" in French philosphy was also a 
manifest passage from the community to the text as a main focus of philosophical interest, 
and the discussion of relations between philosophy and politics is at the same time that of 
the role, place, tasks and obligations of the philosopher in culture. The detour to these 
discussions is made in order to stress the continuity of the text/community (or 
Hegelian/Nietzschean) opposition in current debates on postmodernity and to ask about 
relations between philosophy and politics today. 
1. 
Those who love wisdom (philosophers) and those who love power have always 
exerted a mesmeric influence on one another. The roads of the philosopher and 
the City, the philosopher and the ruler, the roads of truth and politics have always 
crossed, with various results. We know from history famous alliances, commented 
on over the centuries, taken either (more often) as a warning or (less often) as an 
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ideal to be imitated by future generations: Plato and Dionysius from Syracuse, 
Aristotle (already wiser, being rich with Platonic experience — the end of political 
attempts at the slave market) and Alexander the Great, Hegel and Napoleon (e.g. 
in Kojève's version) or, later, Hegel and Friedrich of Prussia (in Popper's 
version), and finally Heidegger and Nazism as well as Lukács and Stalinist 
Marxism. These were different alliances, with different degrees of intensity, 
conviction or faith, deriving from different motivations — from naiveté, noble 
outbursts of spirit, heart, and mind, to consent to evil and a choice of lesser evil, 
to cold philosophical and political calculation. Each pair of relations referred to 
here would require a separate analysis and reflection specific to them, for it was 
something radically different that was desired in various periods of life and 
philosophizing by Hegel, by Heidegger, and still different were motives followed 
by Lukács.1  I would not like to leave the impression that I am unaware of abysses 
separating the aforementioned philosophers' alliances with power (I am 
intentionally using the word "alliance" in a somewhat ambivalent and 
indeterminate sense). These were various philosophers and various powers: it is 
difficult to compare any of the two cases — Plato's and Aristotle's relation to 
power is incommensurable2, just like Heidegger and Lukács' involvements3 (at 
first sight) might seem the closest in time to themselves and to us. The only thing I 
want to show at that introductory stage of my discussion is the fact that even the 
greatest philosophers (or should one perhaps say: especially the greatest?) have 
entered or have been dragged into complicated relations with power, no matter 
whether we take into account Ancient Greece, Romantic or post-Weimar 
Germany. I am convinced that the junction of truth and politics, philosophy and 
power, the question of the "spiritual" or "intellectual" revolution, of the 
thinking/action distinction, of "Epicurean gardens" on the one hand and political 
and philosophical "propaganda" on the other hand (to refer here to the famous 
debate between Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojève 4), of "microphysics" of power 
See e.g. Tom Rockmore, (1995:148-149) who categorically rejects the possibility of comparing 
political involvement of Heidegger and Lukács, motivating it by the fact that Lukács performed 
harsh criticism of Stalinism and never hid the nature or the extent of his engagement, which 
cannot be said of Heidegger (which is perhaps best shown in a political biography by Hug Ott 
(1993). 
2 
Which is strongly stressed by Hannah Arendt in a brilliant text "Truth and Politics" from Between 
Past and Future. Eight Exercises in Political Thought who refers the reader back to Aristotle's 
statements in Book VI of Nicomachean Ethics. 
3 
As Stefan Morawski (1985:284) says in a text "From the History of a Self-Mutilated Mind": 
"Lukács ... reasoned here [in The Destruction of Reason] according to a political key, in its most 
extreme version. 'Who is not with us, is against us' — that is his standpoint". 
4 
Leo Strauss' "Epicurean" attitude, a strictly isolated life of the philosopher who lives "outside the 
world", practices pure theory with no necessary connection to "action" is "fundamentally 
mistaken", according to Kojève (see especially their debate recently expanded with years-long 
correspondence in (Strauss 1991). 
Between the community and the text ... 	 167 
as opposed to its Marxist account etc — that all these belong today — as they almost 
always did — to the most important focusing points for thought, both about the 
past, as well as, first of all, about the present and the future. 
The way of thinking about philosophy and politics seems to be strictly 
connected with the account of the philosopher's place in society — with the 
answer we attempt to give to the question of the role of, more generally, the 
writer in culture. It is worthwhile to think over and refer to one another three 
separate, although related categories: the philosopher, intellectual, writer. For 
the time being, let us think about "writing" in the broadest sense so that we 
could try to trace and then sketch meanders of choices and obligations, 
decisions and expectations of the writer and those which are accorded to him by 
others. We would like to draw a common ethos in French thinking starting with 
the end of the nineteenth century to our postmodern times. We are choosing 
France because it is the French shadow that is darkest with respect to the 
philosopher and the intellectual (see Kwiek 1996, 1997), it was there that until 
recently (or perhaps still?) they were highly respected as their place was 
inscribed in social structures and cultural atmosphere since les philosophes, and 
then since the Dreyfus affair. 
Let us say the following at the very beginning: we want to trace two themes 
that have been struggling and coexisting for over a hundred years, to show their 
constant presence and unchangeable opposition on the basis of a couple of 
examples. One of the themes we want to call communitarian, the other we want to 
call textual, not without some parallels and analogies to Richard Rorty's pair of 
solidarity and self-creation (from his brilliant and highly influential Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity), as writers following the former theme think mainly about 
"community" and "society", while those following the other one think mainly 
about the "text". It is not a traditional opposition between knowing the world and 
expressing one's self, though. Marxian opposition from the eleventh "thesis on 
Feuerbach" remains closed within the world — the command being "change" the 
world, rather than "interpret" it. The opposition that I want to draw here — starting 
in French culture with Zola on the one hand and Flaubert on the others — apart 
from the world, takes into consideration also the text. And in such a form it seems 
to exist in Sartre with his opposition between "poetry" and "committed" literature, 
in Barthes with "writers" and "authors", in Hegel in an influential Kojève's 
account and in Nietzsche according to Deleuze (from Nietzsche and Philosophy), 
as well as in the opposition between dialectics and transgression, until a 
5 The opposition between Zola and Flaubert is perhaps one of the strongest out of many possible 
and it can be read e.g. in the following Sartre's statement from "Introducing Les Temps 
modernes": "The writer is situated in his time; every word he utters has reverberations. As does 
his silence. I hold Flaubert and the Goncourts responsible for the repression that followed the 
Commune because they did not write a line to prevent it. Some will object that this wasn't their 
business. But was the Calas trial Voltaire's business? Was the administration of the Congo Gide' s 
business?" (1988:252). 
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doubtfully successful attempt to step out of it by Michel Foucault in his 
"intellectuel universel"/"intellectuel spécifique" opposition. (I would say more, I 
would like to see in the Rortyan distinction between self-creation and solidarity 
the same, European, French roots, the same contradictions and questions that 
existentialists — whose heroism is so manifest in Rorty — found themselves in. If I 
were to find in French culture a figure of a philosopher with somehow analogous 
hesitations — and a similar attempt at getting out of them — I would point, 
paradoxically enough and not without some doubts, at Georges Bataille who stood 
at the same time on the side of Hegel and on the side of Nietzsche and did not 
want to unite dialectics with transgression, but wandered in his thought from one 
to the other — which is shown by Foucault in his "Preface to Transgression", a 
contribution to Critique issue devoted to Bataille. Despite the difference in 
cultures, time and space, despite the lack of any traces of Bataille in Rorty's 
thinking, the inability, or rather a peculiar, programmatic and still justified 
unwillingness to choose between Hegel and Nietzsche, or between solidarity and 
self-creation in a paralell vocabulary, seems to bind the two thinkers together, 
separating them, at the same time, from e.g. Sartre, Barthes, or Deleuze). 
Thus, to return to the main line of argument — the opposition is between the 
"community" and the "text". It is worth noting that "community" (communauté) 
has recently become one of the most important terms on which some interesting 
philosophical discussions focus and whose point of departure is often Bataille's 
thought and his subsequent projects (Contre-Attaque, College de Sociologic, 
Acephale) — suffice it to remind here of the books by Jean-Luc Nancy, Maurice 
Blanchot or Jean-Francois Lyotard (see Jean-Luc 1991, Blanchot 1988, Lyotard 
1988). I suppose that the opposition distilled here is one of few constants in 
French thinking during the last hundred years or so — what gets changed is the 
point of gravity, bringing the scales down to the earth either on the one, or on the 
other side. 
I take Barthes' attempt to describe the situation in "Authors and Writers" to 
be paradigmatic. Who is the writer and who is the author — who is our textualist 
and who is our communitarian (or a "Hegelian" and a "Nietzschean")? What is 
at stake is, to be sure, the relation to words, to language. The author works in 
words, acts in words, the word itself is neither an instrument, nor a tool, nor a 
vehicle for him. He asks the question "how to write?" and, paradoxically 
enough, as Barthes puts it, that "narcissistic activity has always provoked an 
interrogation of the world" (Barthes 1982:187). The author takes literature as an 
aim and the world keeps returning it to him as a means (somehow like in Kant's 
"asocial sociality" or Hegel's "cunning of reason"). Literature in his view is 
non-realistic but it is precisely that very unreality that allows it to put questions 
to the world, gives literature the power to "disturb the world". It would be 
absurd to ask him about his own commitment — his ("true") responsibility is that 
in the face of literature, just like in Milan Kundera's ideas of the "wisdom of 
the novel" and its "history" from The Art of the Novel and, especially, from his 
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recent Les Testaments trahis.6 The author is the one who desires to be the 
author, his subject matter is the "word". 
Which is not the case with the "writer", merely the writer, to remember right at 
the beginning Barthes accentuation. The writer writes in order to communicate 
with the world, he has political aims for which the word is just a means, an 
insignificant vehiculum. He bears witness, proves, demonstrates, instructs, gives 
lessons; language for him "supports a praxis, it does not constitute one", language 
is an instrument of communication, a mere vehicle of "thought" (Barthes 
1982:189). The author is like a priest, the writer — like a clerk. Textual authors 
and communitarian writers form a typology that derives straight from the reversal 
of Sartre's opposition from his well-renowned text "What Is Literature?": Barthes 
reverses his hierarchy claiming that all interesting men of letters were écrivains 
rather than écrivants, protesting against Sartre's degradation of poetry and 
edification of prose. Out of the same opposition: aestheticism and language games 
versus social and political commitment, Barthes supports the other pole than 
Sartre does, forming (in his Zero Degree Writing) an alternative outline of the 
history of literature since the times of Flaubert — precisely, since 1848 — until the 
present, within which the "task of the author" is not "taking a position", as Sartre 
of that period explicitly wants and in which the function of the author is not, or at 
least is not only and exclusively, appeler un chat tin chat — and modem literature 
is not that "cancer of words" but is a place in which Flaubert and Mallarmé (as 
well as later no more socially useful Proust and surrealists) occupy a significant 
place. As Sartre notes, and it is important to bear that in mind: "A day comes 
when the pen is forced to stop, and the writer must then take up arms. Thus, 
however you might have come to it, whatever the opinions you might have 
professed, literature throws you into battle".7 And the writer takes up arms, but in 
6 See Kundera (1993), especially the leading idea that the novel is le territoire ou le jugement 
moral est suspendu. It may be the case that Zygmunt Bauman goes in the very opposite direction, 
as can be seen from his text "Angst in Postmodernity, or on Truth, Fiction, and Uncertainty" 
(unpubl. typescript). Bauman opposes Kundera to Eco saying that what separates them are 
different experiences, of totalitarianism and of postmodernity, respectively. Truth relegated from 
the real world may find its shelter - precisely in the world of fiction, in the novel. The novel 
would not have to be the "paradise of the individuals" as in Kundera from The Art of the Novel, 
as the postmodern world does not lack diversity, but it may be the world of constant truths that 
can no longer get through today's polyphonicity. Unlimited possibilities seem to be provided by 
the world itself, so the shelter for a coherent vision of the world may be fiction. At the same time, 
Bauman's vision is alternative to the one drawn by Rorty in his "Heidegger, Kundera, and 
Dickens" (Rorty 1991). 
7 Jean-Paul Sartre, "What Is Literature?", op. cit., p. 69. That is reminded by Allan Stoekl in his 
excellent book Agonies of the Intellectual, (1992:307). Generally speaking, I agree to a large 
extent with Stoekl's account of postwar French thought; I consider his discussions extremely 
valuable and I am making here use of several points he makes there (e.g. I am using my 
opposition between "Hegelians" and "Nietzscheans" in a sense similar to his "communitarians" 
and "textualists"). 
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Sartre's ideal the very writing is arms, as is the pen serving to help the oppressed 
rather than the oppressors, for to understand the society in which he lives, the 
writer has just one way — to accept the point of view of its least privileged 
members.8 Which obviously gives birth to unhappy consciousness and bad 
conscience as Sartre from "Introducing Les Temps modernes" puts it: "That 
legacy of irresponsibility has troubled a number of minds. They suffer from a 
literary bad conscience and are no longer sure whether to write is admirable or 
grotesque. ... The man of letters writes while others fight. One day he's quite 
proud of it, he feels himself to be a cleric and guardian of ideal values; the 
following day he's ashamed of it, and finds that literature appears quite markedly 
to be a special form of affectation. In relation to middle-class people who read 
him, he is aware of his dignity; but confronted with workers, who don't, he suffers 
from an inferiority complex" (Sartre 1974:250, emphasis mine). 
Sartre turned to Julien Benda with a (famous) reproach that the clerk is not 
among the oppressed as he is "unavoidably a host of oppressing classes and 
races". The writer is expected to write in a simple and comprehensive manner, his 
language is supposed to be transparent and unambiguous rather than to form an 
amoral and aberrational "poetic prose" in which transparent meaning is covered 
with unclear and ambiguous senses. While for Sartre Flaubert was the beginning 
of the end of the French prose, for Barthes he was a turning point in literature 
being engaged, precisely, with itself. For Sartre the question of writing was one of 
the fundamental ones: "What is writing? Why does one write? For whom? The 
fact is, it seems that nobody has ever asked himself these questions", he will note 
at the beginning of "What Is Literature?". There are many reasons to write; it may 
be an escape from the world, it may also be a tool to conquer the world. But "one 
can flee into a hermitage, into madness, into death. One can conquer by arms. Why 
does it have to be writing, why does one have to manage one's escapes and 
conquests by writing?" (Sartre 1974:48 emphasis mine). According to Sartre, the 
writer has just one single subject — freedom. He writes as a free man to other free 
men (and it is here that writing meets democracy, like in Kundera, or in Derrida 
with his strongly defended idea of tout dire, freedom of "telling everything"). 
Thus to write — means to desire freedom in a specific way. It means to speak to 
one's contemporaries, to stick to one's epoch, without wanting to lose anything 
from it. There may be more beautiful epochs, surely there are — but that one is 
ours, Sartre will say in "Introducing Les Temps modernes". The task of the writer 
is to produce transformations in the surrounding society: both in man's situation 
as well as in his account of himself. The task of the writer is to provide the society 
in which he lives with unhappy consciousness — to present its picture to the 
society making it either either accept that picture as its own or get changed. 
8 
As he will say a little later, in "A Plea for Intellectuals" (from Between Existentialism and 
Marxism, (Sartre 1974:255), a speech pronounced in Japan in 1968. 
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The place of the writer in society in the last three centuries took various forms, 
according to an evolution outlined by Sartre. In the eighteenth century, just before 
the revolution — in the times of Encyclopedists — the writer was seen as a "guide 
and a spiritual leader" of the society. The product of the intellect in that time was 
seen as an action — it produced ideas which brought about upheavals; one could 
contribute with one's pen to a "political emancipation of man in general". The 
writer appears to be a rebel, a rioter, a trouble-maker — he wants to change the 
world. Therefore the eighteenth century was for French writers the only "chance 
and paradise, soon lost" in history. The 19th and 20th centuries are according to 
him a period of mistakes and declines. They brought about a growing rejection of 
ties between literature and society; starting with "icy silence" — a work of 
Mallarmé, to Flaubert writing to "be free from people and things", to Proust who 
was supposed to feel towards other people not solidarity but merely notice their 
"coexistence", to Breton and surrealists. At first, writing was intended to destroy 
the world (1848-1918), then — to destroy literature itself. The key slogan 
appears here — irresponsibility of literature and writers. "The temptation of 
irresponsibility" has belonged to the literary tradition for a century, Sartre will say 
in his "Introducing Les Temps modernes" (Sartre 1974:249), which roughly 
corresponds to my textual theme in French culture. 
Sartre's thinking about philosophy and politics can be traced in an only 
recently published (1994) correspondence with Maurice Merleau-Ponty dating 
from 1953, the year of the abrupt end of their co-operation in Les temps modernes. 
What is the place of politics with respect to philosophy, what would it mean to 
withdraw from the world towards philosophy and philosophical books, what 
should be the philosopher's attitude towards "the requirements of the moment", to 
current political events? How far, if at all, is the intellectual to be "committed"? It 
was a passionate and violent controversy that separated people who had been 
friends until then. Merleau-Ponty did not want to allow to be closed within a 
framework of Sartre's simple opposition between philosophy and politics — and 
put forward his account of what it is to practice philosophy. What was it that 
Sartre was not willing to forgive his adversary? The point was not only to place 
philosophical studies before politics; still more it was an attempt to justify such an 
individual gesture and generalize it for others. Let us listen to Sartre's reproaches 
directed to Merleau-Ponty: "But I reproach you with something far worse, with 
the fact that you withdraw in circumstances in which you ought to make a 
decision as a man, as a Frenchman, a citizen, and an intellectual — taking your 
philosophy as an alibi" (Sartre and Merleau-Ponty 1994). Merleau-Ponty makes 
use of his right to choose, and that is what he is allowed to do. But he is not 
allowed to criticise anyone — and Sartre in particular — in the name of his 
apolitical position, according to Sartre. In Sartre's view, philosophy itself is a 
form of wasting time. One is the philosopher only after one's death — in one's 
lifetime, he says, we are people who among other things write philosophical books 
(which is perhaps not the most important activity). 
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The controversy between the two philosophers concerned the question whether, 
and to which degree, philosophy was adopting an attitude towards the world, to 
which degree it was an activity. As Merleau-Ponty, clearly hurt by Sartre, put it: 
"Philosophy, even if one does not choose between communism and anti-
communism, is some attitude in the world rather than a withdrawal from it". The 
philosopher, an active member of society, does not necessarily have to face up to 
every event — no matter whether that would be the Rosenbergs' execution, the war in 
Indochina or arrests made among French communists, for what he focuses on is the 
oscillation between an event (as a catalyst for thought) and a general reflection in 
the context of which a given event may be inscribed. Merleau-Ponty, defending 
himself against Sartre's accusations makes it explicit that he does not want to be a 
"topical writer", in a way similar, incidentally, to Vladimir Nabokov who in his text 
"On a Book Entitled Lolita" says the following: "Lolita has no moral in tow. For me 
a work of fiction exists only in so far as it affords me what I shall bluntly call 
aesthetic bliss ... There are not many such books. All the rest is either topical trash or 
what some call the Literature of Ideas". With all genre differences and proportions 
respected, Merleau-Ponty defended himself against being taken over by that topical 
trash, keeping faith in what paradigmatically was put by Julien Benda in The 
Betrayal of the Intellectuals and which in turn was described by Sartre as simply 
"abstract daydreaming" and "blabbering". 
2. 
If we say that Barthes' "authors" are "Nietzschean" while his "writers" are 
"Hegelian" (in the sense of the opposition construed by Gilles Deleuze in 
Nietzsche and Philosophy), we will thereby step into a totally new complex of 
questions. That is, for sure, "Nietzschean" in a specific sense of the Nietzsche 
contrasted by the generation of Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault — wanting to "flee 
from Hegel", as the latter put it in L'Ordre du discours (Foucault 1972:235)— with 
the Hegel as he was appropriated and sold to the French public mainly by 
Alexandre Kojève, but also Jean Hyppolite and the whole generation preceding 
the aforementioned one.'°  
See Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy where he says e.g. that "there is no compromise 
between Hegel and Nietzsche", that Nietzsche's philosophy is an "absolute anti-dialectics" or that 
""Nietzsche's work is pervaded with anti-Hegelianism"; these ideas were also popularized in his 
Nietzsche, sa vie, son oeuvre in the "Philosophes" series, Paris: PUF, 1965. 
10 
See my text on Alexandre Kojève: "Philosophy — Politics — Changing the World (the French 
Hegelianism: between Textual Work and Political Propaganda)" in: T. Buksiński (1998) And 
perhaps it is not accidentally that both Foucault and Althusser, as well as Derrida participated in 
Jean Hyppolite's seminars, and the early works of the former two concerned just Hegel. 
Foucault's text got lost, while a part of Althusser's text can be found in a special Hegelian issue 
of Magazine littéraire. 
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Thus we can get the following opposition: Nietzsche, Barthes' authors, 
Sartre's poetry, textuality contra Hegel, Barthes' writers, Sartre's prose, 
communality. We thereby enlarge the stakes: no longer only literature, but also 
philosophy, no longer the man of letters, but also the philosopher — which may 
have been clear since the very beginning of our considerations, as it was at the 
beginning of those put forward by Sartre in his "What Is Literature?". Only one 
figure is Hegelian and Nietzschean at the same time — Georges Bataille who reads 
at the same time both of them, who thinks both dialectically and transgressively, 
who listens to Kojève (although, as some say, snoring during his lectures), comes 
from the circle of dissident surrealists and founds subsequent, still more secret 
"communities".11 Bataille's work, without getting into too many details here (as 
we were doing it elsewhere — see Kwiek (1997a, 1997b)), opens into two sides at 
the same time: in Summa atheologica it opens to Nietzsche, and in The Cursed 
Share it opens to Hegel and Marx (see Besniev 1988). These are radically 
oppositional projects which transgress and nullify each other, if one could have a 
look at them from a single, higher, synthetizing perspective. Bataille does not 
choose between them; both communities — a textual and a political one, the one 
that focuses on "writing", "negativity" as well as "poetry, laughter, and ecstasy" 
(that is, on what Hegel left over in his system in Bataille's account), and the one 
that focuses on economic and political "tasks" and "missions" — remain in a state 
of war with each other. It is like two intellectuals in one person, as Allan Stoekl 
notes, and, furthermore, "this duality of Bataille's project, in one sense, is no 
different from the split we have seen running through French intellectual activity 
in general in the twentieth century" (Stoekl 1985:295). It is as if, at the same time, 
both Zola and Flaubert, or both Maurice Blanchot who searches for a "community 
of readers" and Alexandre Kojève who searches while reading Hegel "a work of 
political propaganda".12 As if both Rorty, the songster of self-creation, and Rorty, 
the songster of solidarity, loving alternately "Trotsky" and the "wild orchids", i.e. 
social issues and private joys, in his writing... 
The Sartrian opposition between the aesthete and the committed writer, as well 
as its Barthesian inversion in the form of authors/writers, have not been seriously 
challenged until Michel Foucault — whose intellectuel universel, to be replaced by 
intellectuel spécifique, takes the meaning of both parts of the said dichotomy. The 
11 
On "communities" in Bataille, see especially Maurice Blanchot, The Unavowable Community, op. 
cit,; besides, Stoekl (1985). 
12 
Which can be seen most clearly in the text "Hegel, Marx et le Christianisme" from 1946 in which 
Kojève makes it explicit that "every interpretation of Hegel, if it is more than idle talk, is nothing 
but a program of struggle and one of work ... And this means that the work of an interpreter of 
Hegel takes on the meaning of a work of political propaganda" (Kojève 1970:42) Stanley Rosen 
in Hermeneutics as Politics notes about Kojève's work that "it was not an act of philological 
scholarism, but an act of revolutionary propaganda". That opinion is also held by Vincent 
Descombes who writes in his Modern French Philosophy about Kojève's "terrorist conception of 
history", by aforementioned Jean-Michel Besnier(1994). 
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point is writing, writer and his place in French culture: "the intellectual par 
excellence used to be a writer — as universal consciousness, free subject, he was 
opposed to those who were just competences in the service of the State or the 
Capital — as technicians, judges, teachers. Since then ... the threshold of writing 
(écriture) as a sacralizing mark (marque sacralisante) of the intellectual has 
disappeared" (Foucault 1994:155). The writer fighting for maintaining his 
political privileges has become in Foucault's view a figure of the past — all that 
"feverish theoretization of writing which we witnessed in the sixties was 
undoubtedly just a swansong" (Foucault 1994:155), and besides, it produced "so 
second-rate (médiocres) literary works". It was not accidentally that Foucault — as 
opposed to, for instance, Jacques Derrida — often stressed that he had never felt to 
have a vocation of a writer. "I don't consider that writing — he will say in 1978 -
is my job and I don't think that holding a pen is — for me, I am speaking only of 
myself — a sort of absolute activity that is more important than everything else".13 
Foucault's response to Sartre and Barthes, to the split present in French culture for 
over a hundred years — and especially to the particular place accorded to the writer 
in it — was to be the figure of the "specific intellectual" who no longer derives 
from the jurist and the writer but from the savant and the expert (like 
Oppenheimer or still earlier Darwin). 
Thus Foucault in my reading rejects both traditional functions of writing (and 
of writer): the avant-garde (textual) and the political (communal) one. So what is 
he left with? Not much, it seems, although at the same time there remains the 
difficult: local struggles described above and — rather impossible in the long run -
struggles with one's own incarnation as the "universal intellectual". For how is 
one to make generalizations from local positions about precisely these positions, 
how is one to generalize without making reference to a recent role (whose clearly 
criticized representative is obviously Jean-Paul Sartre, the guru of the post-war 
France), bashing it, showing its incoherence, invalidity, even harmfulness? How 
to be both a local specialist and a theoretician of that local, intellectual 
specialization? How to convince others to that role, being oneself — functionally -
a man from the previous epoch? Michel Foucault had to fight such a fight with 
himself, he had to promote in the name of universal reasons and in its terms new -
"specific" — function of the intellectual. He was, to be sure, perfectly aware of that 
contradiction and it is perhaps therefore that in his work — like perhaps in no other 
work of living contemporary French philosophers — there are so many discussions 
about the place of the intellectual (or — the philosopher — depending on the period 
of his work) and his possible role in culture and society. 
A careful tracing of Foucault's changing answers to that question would be a 
fascinating task that would throw additional light to intellectual ruptures, 
subsequent new beginnings of the one who always wrote in order "not to have a 
13 
Let us add here, by way of a contrast, that Derrida on numerous occasions wrote and said about 
his passion as a writer, see e.g. (Derrida 1992). 
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face" (Archeology of Knowledge), to attempt to "think differently" (The Use of 
Pleasure) — starting with the early seventies, a famous conversation with Gilles 
Deleuze, genealogical struggles with Power, to the first volume of The History of 
Sexuality, its last two volumes as well as to dozens of texts and interviews from 
that feverish and extremely prolific period of his life. It was already in Archeology 
of Knowldge that he said in an often referred to and commented on passage: "Do 
not ask me who I am, nor tell me to remain the same: that is the morality of a civil 
state; it rules our documents. Let it leave us in peace when we are to write". 
Foucault often stated in his interviews that he had never been a Freudian, 
Marxist, structuralist: that he had been seen as an anarchist, leftist, disguised 
Marxist, nihilist, anti-Marxist, technocrat, new liberal, but "none of these 
descriptions is important in itself; on the other hand, taken together, they 
nevertheless mean something. And I must admit I rather like what they mean" 
(Foucault 1994a:598). Precisely so, without consenting to any other description of 
himself, he all the time kept looking for a paradefinition of what he was doing as a 
philosopher, sociologist, finally, as a man. As Maurice Blanchot puts it: "what 
seems to me to be difficult — and privileged — position of Foucault might be the 
following: do we know who he is, since he doesn't call himself (he is on a 
perpetual slalom course between traditional philosophy and the abandonment of 
any pretension to seriousness) either a sociologist or a historian or a structuralist 
or a thinker or a metaphysician?" (Blanchot 1990:93) We still do not know "who 
he is", as he does not want to join known and respected traditional disciplines 
which he detests as long as he has not redefined them. Michel Foucault, looking 
for himself, for many years was asking, among other things, what the philosopher 
was doing when philosophizing. He kept asking about himself and about others. 
He also kept asking about himself as opposed to others and in distinction to them, 
searching for some general meaning of his work. Let us recall here at least several 
ideas that appear in his writings in that context. 
3. 
In a 1972 conversation with Deleuze — later to be known as "Intellectuals and 
Power" — Foucault said that during May events in France "the intellectual 
discovered that the masses no longer need him to gain knowledge: they know 
perfectly well, without illusion; they know far better than he and they are certainly 
capable of expressing themselves. But there exists a system of power which 
blocks, prohibits, and invalidates this discourse and this knowledge, a power not 
only found in the manifest authority of censorship, but one that profoundly and 
subtly penetrates an entire societal network. Intellectuals are themselves agents of 
this system of power — the idea of their responsibility for 'consciousness' and 
discourse forms part of the system. The intellectual's role is ... to struggle against 
the forms of power that transform him into its object and instrument in the sphere 
of 'knowledge', 'truth', 'consciousness', and `discourse'"(Foucault 1977:207— 
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208) So if the traditional intellectual is — as we already know — the writer, there is 
no possibility of resistance on the part of either écrivants or écrivains, either 
poetry or littérature engagée, against that "enigmatic" Power which is "at once 
visible and invisible, present and hidden, ubiquitous". It can be said, exit the 
writer, but who enters the stage? Precisely who enters is someone about whom we 
know from Foucault's descriptions only what he is supposed not to do and who he 
is supposed not to be. Although the opposition of the two types of intellectuals is 
merely a "hypothesis" (Foucault 1980:132), it is directed against the whole French 
intellectual tradition, with Sartre at the forefront. 
Theory in Foucault's account is not supposed to be a support for practice 
which, in turn, would be its application; theory does not serve practical 
applications, being local, regional and non-totalizing. "This is a struggle against 
power, a struggle aimed at revealing and undermining power where it is most 
invisible and insidious". The point, as Foucault explains to Deleuze, is "to sap 
power, to take power": "it is an activity conducted alongside those who struggle 
for power, and not their illumination from a safe distance. A 'theory' is the 
regional system of this struggle" (Foucault 1977:208). The writer's thinking of the 
world may have been universal, in Foucault's vision suggested here the specific 
intellectual is reduced to play the role of one of many links in an ongoing struggle 
— he is neither a spokesperson of the will of those who fight, nor is he their 
representative (which means drawing radical conclusions from questioning of 
representation), nor is he even an interpreter of their struggles from a safe place 
behind his desk. Theory becomes practice. Those who until then had been 
accorded a specific place in culture of its "consciousness", "conscience" and 
"eloquence" — become potential providers of tools for analysis, of that famous 
"toolbox" with the help of which one can make a topographical description of a 
battlefield... For Foucault, his own philosophy was not the theory of his practice, 
his political practice not being an application of theories presented in 
philosophical books of which he was the author. As Francois Ewald, Arlette 
Farge, and Michelle Perrot say in a moving commemorative volume entitled 
Michel Foucault. Une histoire de la vérité: "there are only practices, theoretical 
practices or political practices, totally specific ones" (Ewald et al. 1985:54). 
The intellectual's work according to Foucault does not consist in shaping the 
others' political will. It rather consists in conducting analyses on the grounds of 
disciplines familiar to him whose aim is, as he puts in a conversation with 
Francois Ewald, "to question over and over again what is postulated as self-
evident, to disturb people's mental habits, the way they do arid think things, to 
dissipate what is familiar and accepted, to re-examine rules and institutions and on 
the basis of this reproblematization (in which he carries out his specific task as an 
intellectual) to participate in the formation of a political will (in which he has his 
role as a citizen to play)" (Foucault 1988:265). Michel Foucault is fully aware of 
the demise of an old, traditional, prophetic function of the intellectual. Those who 
speak and write today are still haunted by the model of a Greek wise man, Jewish 
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prophet or a Roman legislator.14 (And it is important to note that it was also Sartre 
who in the last years of his life considered breaking with the conception of the 
"committed writer". In 1974 in a discussion with Herbert Marcuse he said that 
workers "can better express what the feel, what they think ... For me, the classical 
intellectual is an intellectual who ought to disappear".15) Foucault himself wants to 
take care of the present as the most important question is the one about the present.16 
And that is what he was doing, discussing in his books over the years the relations 
between experience (madness, illness, transgression, sexuality), knowledge 
(psychiatry, medicine, criminology, sexology, psychology), and power (institutions 
connected with the control of the individual — psychiatric or penal ones). As he said 
in Discipline and Punish, what was at stake there — and surely not only there — was 
"writing the history of the present" (Foucault 1979:31) that would perhaps "make 
the present situation comprehensible and, possibly, lead to action" (Foucault 
1988:101). That large theme of the "ontology of the present" guided Foucault's 
thinking in the last years of his life and he found the protoplast of this way of 
thinking about philosophy (as we have known at least since Borges that we produce 
our predecessors) in Kant from the text "What Is the Enlightenment?", about which 
he would write and lecture in College de France. The task of philosophy is to 
describe the nature of the present and us in that present, he would say (Foucault 
1988a:36), inscribing his thought in the tradition running from Kant to Weber to the 
Frankfurt School. The late Foucault made every attempt to inscribe himself in the 
Kantian tradition of making a mature use of reason, but he read Kant via the 
Baudelairean figure of the dandy. In ethics as aesthetics of existence in The Use of 
Pleasure and The Care of the Self he seems to break with an opposition, difficult to 
maintain in practice of which we are still thinking here. He moves towards himself, 
towards building his own ethics of self-transformation.17 Intellectual work seems not 
to go beyond oppositions drawn by Sartre and Barthes, beyond our textualism and 
communality, or romanticism and pragmatism if we refer this issue to Rorty. 
Foucault becomes Rorty's "knight of autonomy" 18 when he notes (in 1983) that for 
him "intellectual work is related to what you could call aestheticism, meaning 
transforming yourself. ... I know very well, and I think I knew it from the moment 
when I was a child, that knowledge can do nothing for transforming the world. 
14 
See the interview with Foucault conducted by B.-H. Levy, reminded recently in Levy (1991:382). 
15 
Which is reminded by L. W. Kritzman (1992:140-177). 
16 As Foucault said: "Genealogy means that I begin my analysis from a question posed in the 
present" (Foucault 1988:262). 
17 
As Sartre (1968:299) said in his Baudelaire: "Baudelaire's single most favourite activity was 
changing: changing his own body, feelings, life — in search of an unattainable ideal of creating 
oneself. He works only not to owe anything to anyone, he wants to regenerate and correct himself, 
as one corrects a picture or a poem, he wants to his own poem for himself..." 
18 
See Richard Rorty (1991:193-198). 
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Maybe I am wrong ... But if I refer to my own personal experience I have the feeling 
knowledge can't do anything for us and that political power can destroy us. All the 
knowledge in the world can't do anything against that" (Foucault 1988b:14). 
Thus it is not much that Foucault's intellectuel spécifique, a new figure suggested 
for our postmodern times, can do. Local and regional struggles with power die out, 
theory is no longer like a fellow-traveller of masses fighting to seize power. 
Parasurrealistic — that is, strange though it may sound, modernistic! — transforming 
one's existence in a poetic manner has little to do with the Sartrian pole of 
"activism" and "commitment", with law-giving, suggesting solutions valid always 
and everywhere, prophesizing about the future on the part of (intellectual and 
philosophical) legislators from a universal place accorded by culture in the past. But, 
on the other hand, that aesthetic of existence does not seem to go beyond the other 
pole of Sartre's and Barthes' oppositions — aesthetic, narcissistic, dandy-like, 
textual. The attempt to go beyond a framework imposed on writing and 
philosophizing some hundred years ago, as we try to outline it here, seems to be 
misguided and unsuccessful. The final acceptance of the fact that "my problem is 
my own transformation" and that what is at stake is "transformation of one's self by 
one's own knowledge" (Foucault 1988b:14), that, to refer to the well-known 
citation, "we have to create ourselves as a work of art" (for our self is not pre-given 
to us and we do not discover its truth) (Foucault 1984:351) — seems to lead back to 
modernistic oppositions. The point is not merely "a certain amount of 
knowledgeableness", it is also "the knower's straying afield of himself': "There are 
times in life when the question of knowing if one can think differently than one 
thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if one is to go 
on looking and reflecting at all", as he will say in the "Introduction" to the second 
volume of The History of Sexuality. 
We would be willing to accept as one of such attempts of the said penser 
autrement the conception of the specific intellectual, never developed and never 
made more precise, never put into practice, i.e. experienced. The "aesthetic of 
existence" of the last two (published) volumes of The History of Sexuality and 
numerous interviews preceding them19 has shown difficulties in going beyond the 
pre-existing constant in French thinking. The intellectual in a classical sense, 
banned and criticized — returned, that is to say, who returned was Foucault writing 
rather than ("locally and regionally") acting. It turned out that even the idea of 
ethics as aesthetics of existence is an idea of a writer who obviously has a 
different place and different obligations in today's postmodern aura rather than an 
19 Let us remind here the most important texts for the "aesthetics of existence": "Introduction" to 
The Use of Pleasure (which earlier functioned as a separate text), the "Qu'est-ce que les 
Lumieres?" text (from P. Rabinow's collection, and then for the first time in French in the 
Kantian issue of Magazine littéraire, Avril 1993), "L'éthique du souci de soi comme pratique de 
la liberté" (Dits et écrits, IV, pp. 708-729), "Une esthétique de l'existence" (ibidem, pp. 730-35), 
as well an English interview given to Dreyfus and Rabinow and published as "On the Genealogy 
of Ethics: An Overview of a Work in Progress" (in Foucault 1984). 
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idea of the one who was born out of the "expert" and "savant", i.e. of the specific 
intellectual. When the turmoil of (post-May '68) struggles with power 
disappeared, when came the consciousness of moderate possibilities of the 
philosopher as a philosopher came, what remained was seducing others with one's 
pen and showing oneself as an example for others: a classical idea of providing 
exemplum for one's descendants.20 Some parts of The History of Sexuality are 
disarming in their sincerity, in their tone of personal confessions, in their 
seriousness of histories put down by a feverish hand. Foucault — to return to Sartre 
— was engaged ("committed") in his writing: not in politics, ideology, but in a 
new, still thought-of morality and ethics. For the idea of morality as obedience to 
a code of rules "is now disappearing, as he says, has already disappeared. To this 
absence of a morality, one responds, one must respond with a research which is 
that of an aesthetics of existence" (Foucault 1989:311). 
4. 
Numerous critics (e.g. Richard Bernstein) see in Michel Foucault the passion of a 
moralist, and often a reproach directed to him is precisely his "cryptonormativism" 
(e.g. Jürgen Habermas, Nancy Fraser), his unwillingness to accept his indebtedness 
to the Enlightenment; for some commentators the philosophy of the late Foucault is 
the "philosophy of freedom" (John Rajchman).21 He is not exactly the 
communitarian or the textualist in the sense presented in this text. Who is he? 
Although in his theory he probably did not manage to transcend Sartre's opposition 
(Sartre, that "man of the nineteenth century who wished to conceive of the twentieth 
century"), in practice, in his written work, one can look for new ways of answering 
the latter's questions. Hence radically different valuations and interpretations of 
Foucault as a philosopher, philosopher of politics or moral philosopher.22 In his 
practice, the author of The History of Sexuality does not fit in the horizon of sense 
outlined in the opposition discussed here, for although for some he is a dispassionate 
"aesthete", for others he is a passionate "moralist", a par excellence political 
philosopher, a radical critic of the status quo, an originator of a new politics of 
resistance, a new liberal etc; for some he is the follower of Kant and the light side of 
sociologie de la modernité, for others the follower of the dark, irrational side of 
20 	
i As s reminded by Tadeusz Komendant, the author of the excellent and the only Polish book on 
Foucault (Komendant 1994:154). 
21 See Richard Bernstein (1992); Jürgen Habermas (1987); Nancy Fraser (1994); John Rajchman 
(1985). 
22 Arnold I. Davidson (1986:232) makes it explicit in summarizing sentences of his text: "Unless 
moral philosophers supplement their discussions of moral codes with ethics a la Foucault, we will 
have no excuse against the charge that our treatises suffer from an unnecessary but debilitating 
poverty". That is perhaps the strongest opinion about Foucault's ethics I encountered. 
180 	 Marek Kwiek 
modernity, that of Nietzsche via Bataille, like in Habermas' or Ferry/Renaut's 
criticism.23 And the point is probably not that there are divergent interpretations, 
that is something we are quite used to — the point may be that we need new 
categories and new dichotomies to attempt to domesticate or tame Foucault's 
thought. 
A possibility was suggested by Foucault himself by way of digression in a long 
conversation with an Italian communist, Duccio Trombadori, in 1978, almost totally 
unnoticed in literature devoted to him.24 He discusses there the question of what 
kind of books he had been writing in his lifetime and draws a distinction between 
livre d'exploration and livre de méthode, or a still different one between 
livre-expérience and livre-vérité. Books-explorations and books on the method, books
-experiences and books-truths, let us say. To be sure, in philosophy the downgraded 
ones have been and still are books-explorations and books-experiences — those most 
precious to Foucault. Books were as rich experiences as possible, so that the writer 
could get out of them as someone else, someone new and changed, precisely — 
transformé. The book transforms him and what he thinks: "Je suis un 
expérimentateur en ce sens que j'écris pour me changer moi-meme" (Foucault 
1994:41-42). The author is a writing experimenter who transforms himself rather 
than a theoretician. He does not know at the beginning of his road what he is going 
to think at the end of it. Thus, to the question about the sense of philosophical work, 
we get two possible answers — we either explore the unknown and transform 
ourselves (and somehow incidentally — we also change others, as a book is an 
invitation to common participation), or we present truth and evidence for it to others. 
Returning to alliances with power, returning to philosophy and politics, let us say 
that it is perhaps so that books-truths were — potentially could be — moving on the 
same tracts with power (with it or against it); communicating, proving, justifying, 
legitimating, validating (like in the case of Barthes' "writers"). The question is 
whether the same can be said of philosophical books-explorations? It seems to me 
that the answer is in the negative, for they seem to be on a different plane, the plane 
of transforming oneself rather than the world (the plane of changing the world only 
after a round way of changing oneself). I fully agree here with Richard Bernstein, -
who is evidently far from being an enthusiast of postmodern thinkers — who 
presented the following diagnosis of postmodern philosophy: "In the early writings 
of Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault and Rorty these questions [ethical-political — MK] 
do not even seem to be considered. Yet as we follow the pathways of their thinking 
and writings something curious begins to happen — for each of these thinkers begins 
See a (once) influential pamphlet of Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, French Philosophy of the 
Sixties. An Essay on Antihumanism, in which Foucault = Heidegger + Nietzsche (like Derrida = 
Heidegger + Derrida's style), Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1990, a chapter on 
"French Nietzscheanism" or e.g. p. 123. 
24 
The exception to which I owe my awareness of that passage is Martin Jay in his splendid article 
"The Limits of Limit-Experience: Bataille and Foucault" (Jay 1995). 
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to gravitate more and more to confronting the ethical-political consequences of their 
own thinking" (Bernstein 1992:11), I am personally convinced that it pertains to 
Derrida — recently just a moralist, and no less to Rorty and Foucault. "Something 
curious begins to happen" and that "something" in question may be associated with 
a decline of a super-project of modernity that makes some questions suddenly 
appear more significant to a growing number of people. 
I was not writing here about Heidegger's and de Man's "affairs", as they are 
commonly referred to (about debates of the greatest minds of the end of the century 
on the subject of rectorate of the former in 1933 and his silence about the Holocaust 
and about the latter's youthful collaborationist and anti-Semitic writings and their 
potential connections with a literary theory developed later); nor was I writing here 
about violent, passionate discussions in France and in America about the questions 
of the "philosopher" and "politics", for that is what was finally at stake there (as 
Krzysztof Pomian (1990:471) so penetratingly put it, the problem of the relations 
between philosophy and politics in the twentieth century has become "the one of 'to 
be or not to be' of philosophy"). From that perspective, our century still remains 
unstudied and unthought, and — to add a still new dimension to our considerations -
we are having a feeling that whenever we are speaking of Heidegger of 1933, to use 
Pomian's words, de nobis fabula narratur... So I was not writing about all these 
discussions, as I am doing it elsewhere, but maybe it is worthwhile just to mention 
that questions about that time, perhaps not accidentally interpreted today — will tell 
us more about ourselves, our today's history, perhaps even about our future... For it 
may be even so that our discussions would not pertain to Heidegger himself or de 
Man himself; these could be left to Heideggerians and deconstructionists. Maybe it 
is worthwhile to think about what the history of the aforementioned two thinkers can 
tell us about our history, about ourselves (see Nancy 1990). What I see as important 
is what the history of the two can tell us of our history, about ourselves here and 
now. For, I suppose, the thinking of past choices, attitudes, past silence, writing, 
acting is the thinking of the constitutive elements of our not so distant past rather 
than of some "aberrations", "mistakes", human "failings" or "weaknesses". If we 
left aside the general question: what to do with those biographical-philosophical 
discoveries?, we would place ourselves somehow somewhere else, next to 
Heidegger's or de Man's past, and in our calm, European, Mediterranean and 
civilized past. And what we mean here is the thought that deliberately served 
ideology, that hid behind it, profiting from it. That gap is very important — we mean 
using ideology in promoting one's own thought in a naive belief that one (as an 
intellectual, as a philosopher) can be the "guide of leaders", to use Plato's 
expression from The Republic. 
Hannah Arendt in Between Past and Future says that nobody ever doubted that 
"truth and politics never remain in good relations with each other" (and Merleau-
Ponty adds that "the relation between philosophy and politics has always existed, 
not for good, but for bad"). Truth and politics — that is, philosophy and politics — are 
"two opposite ways of living" (Arendt 1994:274). For when a philosophical truth 
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enters politics, it is almost certain that freedom can feel endangered. Who will dare 
to reject a — transcendental — truth of philosophers? Who will defy a totalizing, 
coherent and logical — ideological — vision of the world within which the 
philosopher provides us with all possible questions and all possible answers? Is the 
philosopher himself strong enough to resist the temptation to impose his truth on 
others as an obligatory norm? Hannah Arendt has found a congenial description for 
such a situation: the "tyranny of truth" (Arendt 1994:289). Therefore in Arendt' s 
account the philosopher is a recluse rather than a homo politicus; a philosophical 
truth is apolitical by its very nature. It is disclosed by the philosopher — in his or her 
loneliness. Like the Foucault of The History of Sexuality, Arendt seems to appreciate 
learning by example — "the only form of 'convincing' which a philosophical truth 
can afford without deforming its nature" (Arendt 1994:290). The philosopher begins 
to "act" when he transforms a theoretical statement in truth included in an example 
which for him is a limit experience. He cannot go any further, he does not have the 
right to. The philosopher's position is thus to be located outside of the political field, 
such a philosophical being alone cannot be associated with "any political 
commitment or devotion to any cause". The philosopher's truth does not mix -
directly — with the things of this world and if he wants to mix with it (which, 
incidentally, according to Sartre is a definitional task of the intellectual: se mêler de 
ce qui ne le regardait pas), then he turns to tyrants and Führers, from Plato to 
Heidegger, as she notes in her "Heidegger at Eighty". 
Finally, it is not difficult to guess that, to a considerable extent, I agree with the 
author of Thinking, as in the Sartre/Merleau-Ponty debate I take the side of the latter, 
and from the opposition of communitarians and textualists, I choose textualists. But 
that is merely my "individual gesture" of which Sartre wrote in his letter to Merleau-
Ponty which I can make, as long as I am not justifying it with respect to others and 
as long as I am not imposing it on anyone. In an endlessly polyphonic and colorful 
postmodernity, there is enough place for freedom and for individual gestures insofar 
as they do not — in a Rortyan manner — humiliate others and cause them pain. 
Nietzsche said — "The philosopher means something for me as long as he is able to 
give an example". And perhaps the point today is to give the right to different 
examples, the right for them to be merely examples. Some of them will spread, some 
will not; some will be fashionable, others will quickly fall into oblivion; some will 
get through to the reading public, to others no one will be ever convinced. 
Philosophy today may teach, as Zygmunt Bauman put it, "how to live wisely in a 
state of uncertainty" — it may be, as Anna Zeidler-Janiszewska said, "not a love of 
Wisdom, but a love of many possible wisdoms none of which claims 'final' 
ambitions for itself..." 25 That is what I mean when I speak of a multitude of 
possibilities of personal examples today.26 
25 
Zygmunt Bauman (1995:31); Anna Zeidler-Janiszewska (1995:16). 
26 
See my text "Kant — Nietzsche — Foucault. On the Idea of Setting an Example in Philosophy" in 
Kwiek (1998). 
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I would like to close my considerations with a quotation that provides a 
decipherment, very dear to me, of what may be at stake in the debate about 
postmodernity. And I am reading this debate as the one of duties, obligations, 
tasks and place of the intellectual (sometimes the humanist, sometimes the 
philosopher) in culture today. A long detour in thinking about today to Sartre, 
Barthes, Foucault, as well as the French Hegel and the French Nietzsche is 
potentially important, as it may throw additonal light to current concerns. 
Although I have struggled through thick volumes of texts by Lyotard, Foucault, 
Derrida, Rorty and many others, I have never come across such a clear-cut — and 
courageous — description of what may be going on. Let us listen to Zygmunt 
Bauman from his Copernican Lectures given in Torun, Poland: "The stakes is the 
value of the capital accumulated by old-fashioned firms called philosophy, 
sociology, or the humanities, in which we all are at the same time paid 
functionaries and shareholders. The stakes is the current use and exchange value 
of commodities gathered over the years in firms' warehouses. The stakes is the 
usefulness of firms' statutes and regulations which we have learnt by heart, and in 
the application of which we have become masters. The stakes is the peace of 
mind, blissful certainty of authority, the sense of meaningfulness of what one is 
doing..." If this is the case, then indeed — we have years of hard work ahead of 
us... 
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